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 In 1953, the Boston Braves relocated to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, marking the first 
time a major league franchise moved in fifty years.  The Braves’ relocation ushered in 
major league baseball’s first phase of expansion – the relocation phase.  By May 20, the 
Braves matched its entire 1952 attendance (281,000) and finished the season with an 
impressive 1.8 million.  In 1954, the Braves topped two million en route to become one 
of the prominent franchises in the 1950s. 
 Research regarding the Boston Braves’ move to Milwaukee has been minimal.  
The overwhelming focus has been on St. Louis Browns’ owner Bill Veeck’s effort to 
relocate his club to Milwaukee, in the midst of stiff opposition from his fellow league 
owners.  Braves’ owner Lou Perini owned the Triple A Milwaukee Brewers of the 
American Association.  When Veeck attempted to purchase the Brewers from Perini, 
Commissioner Ford Frick used his influence to block the move.  With Veeck blocked on 
every side, National League (NL) owners allowed Perini to relocate to Milwaukee for the 
start of the 1953 season. 
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 This research has enhanced our knowledge regarding major league baseball 
entering its expansion era.  However, what is often overlooked was the Pacific Coast 
League’s (PCL) six-year attempt to become a third major league from 1945 to 1951, and 
how their failed effort influenced the expansion process.  The internal reshuffling of 
major league baseball’s governance and the reclassification of the minor leagues has also 
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been virtually unexplored.  Moreover, scholars acknowledge that the city of Milwaukee 
had built a municipal stadium for approximately $5 million, making the “German 
Athens” a coveted territory for relocation.  However, they have yet to investigate the 
efforts made by civic leaders and local businessmen to build a stadium and lure a major 
league franchise there.  This paper analyzes the forces that led to both the Pacific Coast 
League’s efforts to become a third major league, and the Boston Braves relocating to 
Milwaukee, ushering in major league baseball’s relocation phase.  Two questions will 
serve to guide the narrative: how did the PCL’s efforts to become a third major league 
influence major league baseball’s expansion process; and what were the forces, both 
internal and external, that impacted upon the construction of Milwaukee County Stadium.  
The paper will also trace the Boston Braves move to Milwaukee and analyze the 
importance civic leaders and local businessmen placed on obtaining “major league” 
status to redefine its national identity in the 1950s. 
 At the forefront were the major league owners’ attempts to either maintain their 
existing monopoly or control the expansion process.  In 1945, the Pacific Coast League 
sought to elevate their circuit to a major league classification.  The move was in response 
to a previous effort made by the St. Louis Browns to relocate to Los Angeles and the 
post-World War II prosperity, which made the West the fastest growing region of the 
country.  At the same time, civic boosters in Los Angeles attempted to urge the major 
leagues to either relocate one of its struggling franchises to their growing city, or expand 
their league structure to include the “City of Angels.”  Yet in some ways being the fastest 
growing region worked against the PCL’s effort to become a third major league, and the 
civic boosters’ attempts to lure an existing franchise.  Los Angeles grew 
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disproportionately larger than the other western cities.  The major league owners rejected 
these overtures and established a policy whereby an individual owner could relocate their 
franchise to a new market, if they were willing to bear the expense and make the 
necessary negotiations.  A determining factor for major league expansion was the size of 
the ballparks and adequate parking.  While the stadium became a critical factor that 
dramatically influenced the expansion process, it still required a significant degree of 
external pressure to coerce the owners to expand.  The culmination of both a threat of 
congressional action and Supreme Court intervention, and the overall decline in 
attendance resulted in the major league owners coming to grips with expansion. 
2
 
 Concurrently, civic leaders in Milwaukee undertook a project to build a municipal 
stadium.  The purpose of the project was to erect a memorial to honor the soldiers who 
died in World War I.  By the end of World War II, however, the stadium project became 
an integral part of civic leaders and politicians’ efforts to revitalize Milwaukee’s cultural 
infrastructure.  It also served to shatter the city’s “minor league” image and redefine its 
national identity.  Civic leaders and politicians envisioned a windfall of revenue for their 
growing metropolis as a result of housing the Braves.  Yet it still required a significant 
degree of external pressure from the city fathers to encourage Boston Braves owner Lou 
Perini to move there.  Unlike civic leaders in Los Angeles, Milwaukee’s politicians and 
boosters formed a strong coalition to bring big league ball there.  While these politicians 
and civic boosters probably overestimated the potential revenue a major league franchise 
could bring to their city, their endeavors exemplified the willingness of post-World War 
II cities offering incentives to these owners to hard to refuse.  Moreover, the Braves’ 
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relocation to Milwaukee marked the start of a dramatic restructuring of Major League 
Baseball’s (MLB) consumer market into its current configuration.  
 
 From 1903 to 1953, professional baseball was a relatively stable industry.  At the 
peak of this professional structure were the major leagues – the American and National – 
and a host of minor leagues according to quality.  A complex set of rules and agreements 
between and within various leagues, known as “baseball law,” regulated a vertically 
integrated monopoly known as “Organized Baseball.”  The fundamental underpinning of 
these rules was a number of restrictive practices that formed the governance and 
economics of the industry. 
3
 
 The reserve clause represented a unique part of the contract between baseball 
clubs and their employees.  It bound a player to their respective club until traded, sold, or 
released.  Every club in Organized Baseball agreed not to employ or attempt to employ 
any player reserved by another club.  The owners agreeing to respect each other’s players 
bound by the reserve rule gave the owners a hegemonious relationship over their player 
force. 
 The division of consumer markets among clubs constituted Organized Baseball’s 
second most restrictive practice.  Also referred to as “territorial rights,” this market 
monopoly was instituted on the supposition that consumer demand for professional 
baseball was limited.  As a result, only one club would have a far better chance of 
prospering than if several clubs competed for the same market.  Although it would be 
modified over the years, the owners’ established a population requirement – 75,000 in the 
late nineteenth century – for a club to gain league entry.  A five-mile radius surrounding 
the respective city was also considered as that club’s territorial region.  Territorial rights 
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did not solve the problem of the unequal size of markets among the clubs of a league.  
However, this market imbalance was offset somewhat by the wealth and population of 
industrial America, as well as the best transportation system, residing in the Northeast.  
Virtually all of the major league teams were located in this comparatively compact and 
economically developed region of the country.  Being concentrated in this area enabled 
major league baseball to deal with the damaging impact of two world wars and the Great 
Depression. 
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 The sixteen major league clubs were both business partners and competitors.  
They cooperated in the creation of a general set of operating rules, developing common 
playing schedules, and by eliminating competition for players.  Major League owners 
also cooperated in attempting to maintain public faith in the sport’s integrity.  This issue 
became crucial after the 1919 Black Sox scandal, in which Chicago players cooperated 
with gamblers in fixing the World Series.  The owners created the commissioner’s office 
to reassure the public that the game was honest. 
 The 1922 Supreme Court ruling – the Federal League case – 259 US 200 – 
solidified major league baseball’s control over its economic environment.  The Court 
ruled that baseball was not a form of interstate commerce, thus not subject to antitrust 
laws.  Exemption from prosecution under antitrust laws gave baseball a unique status.  
Organized Baseball became a self-regulating monopoly and the major leagues wrote the 
rules that covered their relationship with the minor leagues.  The most critical business 
relationship between the major and minor leagues was the draft system.  While the 
number of their supporting minor leagues fluctuated, the minors provided the major 
leagues with a large pool of cheap talent.  The annual draft of minor league players 
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ensured that quality talent advanced up the ladder toward the majors, but this movement 
was contingent upon terms favorable to the big leagues.  The major leagues fixed prices 
on drafted players as an incentive for minor league owners to sell their best players, 
rather than losing them in the less profitable draft. 
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 The culmination of the antitrust exemption, the reserve clause, and territorial 
rights represented the cornerstone of baseball’s system of self-regulation for profit.  The 
reserve clause enabled member clubs to control the terms of employment of their 
respective players.  Major League owners allocated consumer markets by sharing New 
York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, and St. Louis.  The National League was granted 
exclusive rights in Brooklyn, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati, and the American in 
Washington, Cleveland, and Detroit.  These territorial alignments remained intact for half 
a century. 
 Not all major league clubs enjoyed this sense of stability, however.  The St. Louis 
Browns of the American League (AL) were, according to historian James Edward Miller, 
“baseball’s by word for futility and mediocrity.”  In fifty-two years the Browns won one 
AL pennant, finished second twice, sixth eleven times, seventh twelve times, and last ten 
times.  The Browns’ attendance reflected this performance.  From 1932 to 1936, they 
averaged a little more than 98,000 fans a year, and according to historian William 
Marshall, only 34 fans attended a game in 1933.  Browns’ owner Phil Ball died that same 
year, depriving the club of a magnate who was rich enough to subsidize the team and 
willing to take financial losses.  The executors of Ball’s estate refused to invest more 
capital in a losing ball club.  In 1934, the club finished sixth and lost a reported $54,000.  
The following year the Browns finished seventh and drew 80,922 fans. 
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 In 1936, the executors sold the Browns to a contingent headed by Donald Barnes, 
owner of an investment firm, and William O. and Charles DeWitt.  The new owners 
raised $100,000 to pay for the club by selling stock, and the American League loaned 
them an additional $50,000 to complete the deal.  In their first four years under new 
management, the Browns lost over $100,000 each year.  Bill DeWitt, the club’s general 
manager, had devised a sound strategy to build the Browns into a pennant contender – 
hiring scouts, building a farm system, and acquiring major league talent from other 
teams.  However, the Browns’ management simply lacked the financial residuals to 
achieve their goals. 
 In 1941, the Browns’ financial picture was so bleak that Barnes attempted to 
transfer the franchise to Los Angeles.  In a 1949 Sporting News interview, the Browns 
owner unfolded the details of this huge undertaken that began in mid-season.  According 
to Barnes, Harry Arthur, president of the Fanchon & Marco Amusement Company, 
approached him several times regarding a possible shift to the West Coast.  Arthur 
reportedly told Barnes that there were interested parties who, from a civic standpoint, 
were willing to bring major league baseball to the West Coast.  Barnes flew to Los 
Angeles and met with a group of civic leaders, headed by A. P. Giannini, co-founder of 
Bank of America.  The Browns owner informed the group that he would be willing to sell 
them part of the stock in the club to finance a deal to purchase the Los Angeles Angels of 
the Pacific Coast League.  This transaction was essential to gain the territorial rights so 
the AL club could move there. 
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 Barnes then met with several AL owners and Chicago Cubs mogul Phillip K. 
Wrigley.  AL owners Connie Mack (Philadelphia Athletics), Clark Griffith (Washington 
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Senators), and Tom Yawkey (Boston Red Sox) expressed concerns over the safety of the 
players, since the Browns’ transfer would require the clubs to make trips to the coast by 
air travel.  Nevertheless, according to Barnes, the AL magnates gave him the green light 
to explore the possibility of moving the Browns.  In October 1941, Barnes met with 
Wrigley to negotiate a deal to purchase the Los Angeles franchise.  After considerable 
negotiation, Wrigley was willing to sell the franchise, the players on the Angels’ roster, 
and Wrigley Field for a reported $1,000,000. 
 Next, Barnes underwent a series of negotiations with St. Louis Cardinals owner, 
Sam Breadon.  The Browns owned Sportsman Park and they had invested heavily in a 
new scoreboard, and five years remained on their rental agreement with the Cardinals.  
According to the terms of the agreement, Breadon would pay the Browns $250,000 to 
leave St. Louis, give them two players valued at $25,000 each, and assume the Browns’ 
leasing agreement with the Dodier Realty Company.  At the same time, Breadon would 
attempt to influence the NL owners to approve the Browns transfer.  Baseball law 
required a unanimous consent from the owners of both leagues to approve a franchise 
shift.  Moreover, the NL owners would probably have no qualms about the Browns 
moving to Los Angeles.  St. Louis would become the exclusive territory of the National 
League. 
8
 
 While Barnes maneuvered within MLB’s infrastructure, Harry Arthur made 
preparations for the Browns’ transfer to Los Angeles.  The Angels would be transferred 
to Long Beach, where civic leaders made assurances that a park would be erected, once 
the city was awarded the franchise.  The other PCL franchise, the Hollywood Stars, was 
given the option to remain or relocate.  If the Stars stayed, the Browns would cooperate in 
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devising a schedule that would not conflict with each other.  Moreover, the Los Angeles 
Junior Chamber of Commerce went on record guaranteeing an annual attendance of 
500,000 for five years.  If the Browns attendance did not reach this figure, the Chamber 
of Commerce would underwrite the difference. 
 Barnes drew up a new playing schedule for the 1942 season and devised a travel 
agenda to ease the concerns of his fellow owners.  On December 6, 1941, Barnes and the 
DeWitt brothers met with K. O. Cocke, vice-president of sales for Trans World Airlines 
(TWA), to finalize the travel plans.  Railroad officials from the Santa Fe Chief also 
attended the meeting.  Reportedly, each club would make three trips to the West Coast, 
but only one trip would be made by air travel.  Chicago was the “jumping-off” place for 
all flights and between 21 and 28 flights took off daily from the Windy City to Los 
Angeles.  Therefore, no club was compelled to place all of its players on one or two 
planes.  In other words, players could have been transported at the rate of one, two, three, 
or four per flight, so there would be no danger of losing an entire club, or a major portion 
of it, in an air disaster.  According to the airline officials, 98 percent of all flights during 
the baseball season completed their trips.  League clubs would use the Santa Fe Chief for 
the other trips.  The revised schedule provided an open date the day before a league club 
was scheduled to come to California.  The Browns’ management was also willing to 
underwrite a portion of the AL clubs’ travel expenses for at least five years.  Since the 
Junior Chamber of Commerce guaranteed an attendance of 500,000, the Browns were 
prepared to pay each visiting club an additional 25 cents per head over the pay-off 
required by the American League.  In other words, the Browns would add an additional 
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25 cents per admission to the visiting team’s share of the gate receipts or the guarantee, 
which ever was greater. 
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 The following day Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and America entered World War 
II.  Any aspirations of moving the St. Louis Browns to Los Angeles came to an abrupt 
end.  On December 9 at the American League’s winter meeting, the owners voted 
unanimously against the Browns proposed transfer to Los Angeles.  Barnes also voted 
against the move.  When asked why he went along with the other owners after seriously 
considering the move, Barnes replied: “After submitting the proposal and after hearing 
the discussion relative to it by the league in general, I decided along with other members 
of the league that it would be best to vote to retain the Browns in St. Louis.” 10 
 Clearly America’s entry into the war thwarted the Browns move to Los Angeles.  
Wartime controls on fuel and transportation made any westward move impractical.  
However, the Browns aborted to move to Los Angeles illustrated the complexities 
involved in relocating a franchise to a new market.  An owner attempting to move his 
club required him to establish a political coalition among his fellow owners.  Without this 
contingent, he could never receive the necessary votes to move.  If the owner desired to 
move into a new territory owned by another major league magnate, it was necessary to 
acquire the territorial rights, transfer or purchase the minor league players, and buy or 
lease the stadium.  The magnate would have to dispose the tangible assets within their 
current territory – primarily the stadium.  Adjustments would have to be made to the 
league’s playing schedule, in terms of revising the road trips and travel itineraries.  
Barnes’s travel schedule appears awkward by today’s standards, but jet air travel was 
something new to a generation of owners whose primary mode of transportation was by 
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rail.  Therefore, their reluctance to embrace this manner of travel was understandable.  
The task of relocating a franchise was a huge and expensive undertaking. 
 Since the Browns were a financially weak franchise, they needed assistance from 
the city seeking a major league club.  A booster coalition, in the form of civic leaders, 
businessmen, and politicians, was essential in making the transfer a reality.  Boosterism 
has had a long history in sport.  Local boosters used sport as a valuable tool for 
community enhancement.  Promoters took on the task of promoting their communities in 
order to attract capital investment and political visibility.  They were eternal optimist, 
growth oriented, and willing to take risks.  Boosters were drawn to baseball because of its 
ability to generate visibility and support.  Evidently, luring the Browns to Los Angeles 
was part of a larger aspiration to place the national spotlight on the City of Angels.  Los 
Angeles Examiner sportswriter Davis Walsh speculated whether the “interested parties” 
Barnes referred to were the same men responsible for bringing the national golf 
championship to the city in 1942. 
11
 
 By 1940, Los Angeles was one of the fastest growing cities in America and it 
became a dominant city in its region.  Defense spending stimulated the city’s rapid 
growth during and after the war, as the federal government spent $30 billion on direct 
defense spending in the West.  The defense industry was also the catalyst for a 
spectacular growth in the population and allowed for new uses of urban space – urban 
renewal for minorities and stadium construction to lure a professional franchise.  The 
population growth was phenomenal, as 500 new residents per day moved to Los Angeles 
between 1945 and 1955 for a ten-year total of 1,725,000 migrants.  By 1950 Los Angeles 
was almost 38% of California’s population.  Moreover, the city represented the kinds of 
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demographic changes occurring in American cities, particularly in the West, that would 
alter Organized Baseball’s consumer market. 12 
 “Interested parties” in Los Angeles continued to make efforts to bring major 
league baseball to the West Coast.  The Browns aborted move to the coast, however, 
evidently disturbed several club owners in the Pacific Coast League.  The PCL had long 
been recognized as one of the premier minor league circuits.  The PCL played the longest 
schedule in Organized Baseball, as many as 225 games a season.  Major League stars like 
Frank “Lefty” O’Doul, Tony Lazzeri, and Joe DiMaggio played in the PCL.  On 
December 5, 1945, the Los Angeles Times reported that PCL club members voted 
unanimously to make their organization a “full major league.”  A three-man committee 
headed by league president Clarence “Pants” Rowland, San Francisco club president 
Charley Graham, and Hollywood president Victor Ford Collins led the effort to elevate 
their organization to a major league, beginning in the 1946 season.  Acquiring major 
league status was contingent upon the approval by the commissioner, the two major 
league presidents, and the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues – the 
governing body of the minor leagues.  The three-man committee sought to obtain major 
league status within the parameters of baseball law. 
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 Concurrently, both the major and minor leagues underwent a dramatic reshuffling.  
Albert B. “Happy” Chandler was elected commissioner after the death of Kennesaw 
Mountain Landis in November 1944.  From the outset, several owners attempted to usurp 
Chandler’s powers as commissioner.  The former Governor and Senator from Kentucky 
defeated several moves to reduce his power, and he stood up to the owners and won 
approval of his programs.  At baseball’s winter meetings, the minor leagues voted to strip 
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Chandler of his veto power and remove baseball’s promotional activities from his office.  
Major League owners refused to support the minors’ actions and instead approved one of 
the commissioner’s pet projects, a rule prohibiting baseball from signing high school 
players unless they had been out of school for more than a year.  The minor leagues also 
created a new Triple A classification.  Leagues would be classified as either A, AA, or 
AAA.  The PCL, the International League, and the American Association were elevated 
to Triple A status.  The new classification put a higher price on players selected in the 
annual draft and established new salary and player limits. 
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 Despite its new classification, the PCL continued to push for major league status.  
On December 8, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the minor league executives 
approved the PCL’s request to become a third major league, and they would be 
“welcomed back” if the American and National Leagues rejected their application.  From 
the outset, Rowland recognized that a status change did not make his PCL a “major 
league.”  He did not ask that the PCL champion play the winner of the World Series, nor 
did he claim that club owners were ready to pay major league salaries, which averaged 
$9,000 more than the coast league.  As a major league, the PCL would not be placed in 
the unenviable position of selling its star players to avoid the draft.  Moreover, major 
league baseball’s consumer market would be increased significantly.  Collectively, eight 
PCL clubs had a population of over four million and the west was undoubtedly one of the 
fastest growing regions of the country.  Hollywood Stars business manager Oscar 
Reichnow pointed out that the PCL’s attendance had tripled from one million in the 
prewar seasons to three million in 1945. 
15
 
 14 
 Despite these factors, the American and National Leagues refused to consider the 
PCL’s application to become a third major league.  Both leagues took a dim view of this 
West Coast circuit cutting into their exclusive territory.  However, they soften their 
stance somewhat by acknowledging the PCL as a “potential major league territory.”  
League presidents Will Harridge (AL) and Ford Frick (NL) issued a joint statement 
outlining the criteria for gaining major league status.  Their press release typified the kind 
of rhetoric major league owners and officials uttered in the postwar era.  Both presidents 
stated that a name change did not constitute major league status.  According to Harridge 
and Frick, a host of factors would have to be considered in order to become a major 
league.  They also asserted the need to address a critical factor that would dramatically 
influence the expansion process – the size of the ballparks and adequate parking. 16 
 In response to the joint statement, Rowland declared that the PCL would return 
“and it will not be with hat in hand but with a straight-from-the-shoulder demand that we 
be given the right to offer our people that to which they were justly entitled – major 
league baseball.”  He added that the major league owners were “postponing the 
inevitable,” as millions of baseball-minded people in California, Washington, and Oregon 
wanted better than minor league baseball.  Moreover, PCL officials could not accomplish 
their ambition to become a third major league while dealing with the draft, or facing the 
forced sale of star players to avoid the draft.  Undoubtedly, this factor, along with the 
Browns’ aborted move to Los Angeles five years earlier, influenced the PCL’s efforts to 
become a third major league. 
17
 
 The following year Rowland made a second effort to obtain major league status 
for his PCL.  At the major league meetings in July, Rowland ask for a new classification 
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as “The Pacific Major League,” and for an exemption from the major league clubs to 
purchase the best PCL players for a maximum price of $10,000.  Rowland argued that the 
PCL deserved special consideration because it was more than a Triple A league.  Its 
attendance exceeded the combined totals of the International League and the American 
Association.  By the end of the 1946 season, PCL attendance leaped to 3.7 million fans.  
Moreover, Rowland also wanted to protect the league “from the vultures who would like 
to descend on their little golden lode.” 18 
 Simultaneously, several spokesmen from Los Angeles, including County 
Supervisor Leonard Roach and Los Angeles Examiner sportswriter Vincent Flaherty, 
revived efforts to lure a major league franchise.  From as early as December 1945, 
Flaherty had been campaigning for a major league franchise for Los Angeles.  In a survey 
of PCL sportswriters, Flaherty reportedly said in the Sporting News that the PCL could 
not hope to compete with the two major leagues due to a lack of capital.  He pointed out, 
however, that the coast league had two major league cities in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco.  With the war ended, the prospect of relocating the St. Louis Browns to Los 
Angeles was being reconsidered.  These efforts conflicted with Rowland’s effort to 
achieve major league status for all of its members, including those in smaller markets.  
The loss of either Los Angeles or San Francisco would threaten the league’s market 
potential.  This external pressure fueled the Coast League officials’ determination that the 
major leagues would come west through the upgrading of the entire league, instead of 
relocating an existing major league franchise to a single city.  The possibility of a Browns 
move to Los Angeles posed a serious threat. 
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 In response to Roach and Flaherty’s efforts to lure a major league franchise, PCL 
officials sought a revision in the rules to protect their league from possible invasion.  
Concurrently, they voted again to press its efforts to become a third major league.  The 
Los Angeles Times reported that PCL officials began the initial attempt to increase 
stadium size and provide adequate parking.  Once major league recognition was granted, 
all league clubs pledged to expand their facilities and “improve the standards of [their] 
teams...” Construction of new parks had supposedly begun in Portland and San Diego. 20 
 Once again major league owners thwarted the PCL’s efforts to become a third 
major league.  A compromise solution was reached whereby the major leagues postponed 
recognizing the PCL as a major league for five years.  In return, the major leagues would 
support the PCL’s desire for territorial protection.  The PCL could also retain any player 
drafted, if the circuit matched the salary the drafting club offered.  However, major 
league owners reneged on the promise of territorial protection.  Instead, the majors 
agreed that a league club could move into the PCL’s territory by either compensating the 
people involved, or both parties accept a negotiated figure arrived through arbitration.  
More important, in the midst of postwar prosperity, it was evident the major league 
owners did not want to take on additional partners. 
21
 
 On the other hand, Supervisor Roach and Flaherty’s attempts to bring major 
league baseball to Los Angeles were frustrated by the territorial rules of baseball law.  
Los Angeles was the property of Chicago Cubs owner Phil Wrigley.  If a struggling 
franchise, like the St. Louis Browns, wanted to move to the coast, they would have to 
purchase the franchise rights from Wrigley, the ballpark, and possibly the players on the 
Angels’ roster.  They would also have to make an indemnity payment to the PCL for their 
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loss franchise.  Considering the Browns’ weak financial condition, the city of Los 
Angeles, no doubt, would have to bear some of the expense of moving them there.  In 
addition, there was no evidence to indicate that these boosters mounted a campaign to 
either build a new stadium to adhere to “major league standards,” or renovate Wrigley 
Field.  If they chose to renovate Wrigley Field then the city would have to purchase the 
ballpark from the Cubs owner.  The Los Angeles Coliseum was the only alternative site, 
but playing there was still contingent upon buying the franchise rights from Wrigley.  
Furthermore, the Coliseum was more suited for football than baseball.  In any event, 
franchise relocation represented an expensive and complex undertaking. 
 In 1947, PCL officials made a third request to obtain major league recognition.  
Led by San Francisco Seals president Charles Graham, the Coast delegation requested 
that the PCL be granted a three-to-five year trial as a major league and that the magnates 
suspend their draft of the league’s players, to enable them to develop a reservoir of top-
level talent.  But the owners referred the PCL’s petition to baseball’s executive council, 
who planned to make a trip to the West Coast to survey the region for possible expansion.  
Supposedly, the trip would also determine whether the PCL warranted suspending the 
draft of their players. 
22
 
 Major League owners also referred Supervisor Roach’s second attempt to lure an 
existing franchise to Los Angeles to the executive council.  Reportedly, Roach had 
invited the council to Los Angeles to persuade them on the merits of bringing big league 
baseball there.  He claimed to represent every civic organization in the southern 
California city.  In an open letter to Commissioner Chandler, Roach indicated that a 
prospective franchise would play their home games in the Los Angeles Coliseum.  The 
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executive council, however, scheduled no meeting with Roach.  According to the New 
York Times, Chandler told reporters: “We are here as the Coast League’s guests and our 
only consideration at present is the proposals they have made.”  In addition, Lieutenant 
Governor Goodwin Knight supported the PCL’s desire for major league consideration 
and reportedly said, “We are completely past the bush-league stage.”  Such comments 
appear to marginalize Roach’s assertion that he represented every civic organization in 
the city. 
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 By November, the Pacific Coast League modified its position and asked for a 
classification above Triple A status, with aspirations of gaining major league status in 
three-to-five years.  Under this new classification, the Coast League would be under the 
jurisdiction of Commissioner Chandler and the executive council.  PCL officials also 
requested a name change to the “Pacific Coast Major League,” an increase in the draft 
price from $10,000 to $25,000, and the draft eligibility be raised from four to six years.  
These requests were consistent with the PCL’s desire to develop a reservoir of playing 
talent to major league standards. 
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 The Pacific Coast League suffered a serious setback at both the minor and major 
league winter meetings.  Led by the American Association, the minor leagues 
unanimously rejected the PCL’s resolution.  Association President Frank Lane summed 
up the minors’ disdain for the PCL’s request by stating: “Why don’t they quit trying to 
kid everybody else, including themselves?”  He added: “Under their proposal they’d be 
neither fish nor fowl.”  According to the New York Times, International League President 
Frank Shaughnessy had publicly blasted the idea several times.  Despite this stiff 
opposition, the minors gave the PCL permission to continue their attempts to become a 
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third major league.  As the Los Angeles Times astutely noted, the minors would probably 
“stand pat on that attitude, letting the majors apply the ax.” 25 
 On December 11, at the American and National League’s joint session, the 
owners rejected the PCL’s petition for major league recognition on a trial basis for a third 
time.  Instead, the magnates adopted a resolution that left “the door open” for possible 
territorial expansion and eventually expanding their league structure from eight to ten 
clubs.  Commissioner Chandler proposed the idea of expanding both leagues, with the 
possibility of adding Los Angeles, Hollywood, San Francisco, and Oakland.  However, 
according to the New York Times, both leagues were divided on the issue, with the 
National League voting unanimously for a ten-club circuit.  However, the American 
League voted five to two against the plan, with Cleveland abstaining. 
26
 
 Understandably, the major league owners positioned themselves to control any 
plans to expand their circuits within the parameters of baseball law.  Nothing illustrated 
their intention more than their press release to the public: “...while the majors again shut 
down the Coast League bid for major rating in toto, they [the owners] left an opening for 
individuals members to seek major league entry. Such actions, however, must be initiated 
by those clubs which would have to assume all cost and responsibility.”  Yet by the same 
token, the owners could not ignore the fact that the West Coast was the fastest growing 
region in the country, and their weak franchises in St. Louis and Boston (NL) were a 
cause of concern.  Were the major league owners seriously considering expanding their 
league structure or relocating their weak franchises?  Several factors suggest that the 
magnates were more concern with sustaining their monopoly and maintaining the status 
quo. 
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 Major League Baseball’s immediate postwar attendance boom constituted the first 
factor.  The Pacific Coast League attempted to gain major league recognition at a time 
when the majors experienced unprecedented prosperity.  Before World War II 10 million 
fans for all of major league baseball represented a banner year.  In 1946, attendance rose 
to 18.5 million and reached 20 million in 1948 and 1949.  Weak franchises, like the 
Philadelphia Athletics and Washington Senators, profited during this period.  In the midst 
of this attendance boom, the last thing major league owners wanted was additional 
partners. 
28
 
 Second, nothing illustrated the owners’ monopoly behavior more than the way 
they dealt with the new medium – television.  While television was of great importance 
for baseball’s future, televised broadcasting was still in its formative stage in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.  Local broadcasting of baseball began in 1946.  Three years later, 
the National Broadcasting Company developed the first limited “network” to telecast a 
World Series along the East Coast.  The fundamental issue was to what extent Organized 
Baseball could exert control over this new technology.  Baseball took its initial steps after 
World War II toward control by enacting Rule 1(d).  This baseball law prohibited clubs 
from broadcasting into another major or minor league territory.  It also prevented a 
visiting team from broadcasting from the home club’s stadium without permission.  
Organized Baseball showed its determination to regulate the broadcasting of its games by 
killing the Liberty Broadcasting System (LBS).  The LBS represented the first effort to 
establish a national radio sport broadcasting network.  Cooperation with Organized 
Baseball was critical for the LBS’s survival.  In response, the major leagues invoked Rule 
1(d), banning the LBS from re-broadcasting their games in minor league territory.  
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National League attorney Louis Carroll told a House committee that Organized Baseball 
crushed the LBS, firmly establishing the principle that it enjoyed control over 
broadcasting rights. 
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 A final factor dealt with the rise of the Mexican League, an outlaw circuit.  In 
1946, seventeen players jumped their major league contracts for promises of higher 
wages.  New York Giants outfielder Danny Gardella was among the seventeen players 
who made the jump across the border.  Commissioner Chandler declared the contract 
jumpers ineligible, blacklisting those players for five years.  After playing one season in 
the Mexican League, Gardella sought to return to the Giants and was turned down.  
Gardella brought suit against his former club, marking the start of several challenges 
against Organized Baseball’s reserve clause.  The Gardella case goes beyond the scope of 
this study.  What is important here is that the combination of Gardella’s suit, and the 
PCL’s effort to become a third major league were challenges to Organized Baseball’s 
fundamental business practices – territorial rights and the reserve clause. 30 
 Within this context, the Pacific Coast League was in open revolt.  They had been 
totally frustrated in their attempts to gain major league recognition, within the framework 
of baseball law.  Between 1948 and 1951, the PCL threaten to break from the National 
Association and operate as an outlaw league.  During the 1951 winter meetings, Ford 
Frick announced a plan to elevate the minor leagues to major league status.  A new 
classification above Triple A was established for leagues or associations with at least 
eight teams whose consumer markets included at least 10 million people, possessed 
ballparks with a combined seating of 120,000 that had an averaged paid attendance of 
over 2.25 million for the preceding five years.  Once a minor league reached this “open” 
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classification, a new set of conditions had to be met to achieve major league status.  
These included: a consumer market of 15 million, ballpark capacity of more than 25,000 
for each franchise, and a paid attendance of at least 3.5 million for each of the previous 
three years.  Major League Baseball had raised the bar so high that it was problematic for 
any Triple A league to gain major league status.  According to the census figures in 1950, 
the combined population of PCL cities was a little over 4.5 million.  Their seating 
capacities for their ballparks were 117,850.  More troubling, the PCL’s attendance, along 
with several other minor leagues, began to decline sharply.  In 1949, the minors drew 41 
million fans with 49 leagues and 446 teams.  By 1953, attendance dwindled to 22 million, 
38 leagues, and 284 teams.  Major League owners had no intentions of expanding their 
infrastructure. 
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 However, by 1950 Organized Baseball found itself being pressured on several 
fronts.  First, efforts to crush the Liberty Broadcasting System occurred almost at the 
same time the Supreme Court was examining baseball’s antitrust exemption.  New York 
Yankees’ prospect George Toolson filed suit against his employer on the grounds of 
being deprived, through the reserve clause and blacklisting, of his professional means of 
livelihood.  When Tooslon v New York Yankees reached the Supreme Court, a principle 
argument was that by entering into contractual agreements with television baseball was 
engaging in interstate commerce.  Organized Baseball was wary of negotiating a national 
television contract until the court ruled on this case.  The minor leagues garnered support 
from Congress to convert the 1950 version of Rule 1(d) into law.  Senator Edwin 
Johnson, a senior minority member of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee and president of the Western League (Class A), introduced legislation to 
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legalize Rule 1(d).  Johnson asserted that television was destroying the minor leagues.  
He arranged hearings to put pressure on the major leagues to end the game of the week 
and back his legislation.  Organized Baseball managed to avoid this potential minefield of 
court litigation and proposed legislation.  Chicago Federal Court Judge John P. Barnes 
ruled that the clubs had a right to control and profit from broadcast of their own games, 
and the Supreme Court reaffirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption in the Toolson case. 32 
 Second, in July 1951 Brooklyn Congressman Emanuel Celler of the House 
Judiciary Committee opened an extensive series of hearings before a subcommittee 
charged with the “study of monopoly power.”  He called a number of representatives of 
Organized Baseball and asked for their justification regarding their restrictive economic 
practices and the sport’s antitrust exemption.  Celler raised a number of uncomfortable 
issues that included the farm system, the reserve clause, territorial rights, the exclusion of 
the West Coast and other cities from the major leagues, and the treatment of minor league 
players.  Various individuals with agendas and grievances against Organized Baseball, 
ranging from disgruntled players to officials from the West Coast who lobbied for big 
league franchises, were given the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee.  
Knowing how sensitive major league owners were to charges of monopoly, Los Angeles 
supervisor Roach accused them of conspiring to keep Los Angeles from becoming a 
“member of the major league family.”  Republican Congressman Patrick Hillings 
pressured the owners to either expand to the West Coast, or assist the PCL to become a 
third major league.  Baseball officials, including (now former) Commissioner Chandler, 
NL President and Commissioner designate Ford Frick, AL President Will Harridge, and 
Chicago Cubs’ owner Phil Wrigley, were also summoned and subjected to lengthy 
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questioning.  In the end, however, the subcommittee made no recommendation and 
Congress took no action. 
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 Major League Baseball managed to survive the external pressure brought on by 
the Pacific Coast League’s attempts to become a third major league, Supreme Court 
rulings, court litigations, and extensive congressional hearings.  Expanding or revising 
major league baseball’s infrastructure rested solely in the hands of the owners.  The 
PCL’s plight resulted in the magnates establishing a policy that an individual owner 
could relocate their franchise to a new market, if they were willing to bear the expense.  
The attempts of local boosters and politicians in Los Angeles to lure a major league 
franchise frustrated the PCL’s efforts to elevate their entire league and whetted the 
appetites of MLB owners, with struggling franchises, to move to this growing market.  
These boosters’ endeavors, however, were thwarted by MLB’s territorial rights, the lack 
of a suitable stadium, and their failure to establish an effective coalition of politicians and 
businessmen to advance the project.  Yet the major league magnates had to come to grips 
with the changes in demography, in the postwar economy, and civic boosters pressuring 
the owners to bring big league baseball to their growing cities.  By 1950 major league 
attendance began to decline, dropping sharply to 17,227,000.  Two years later, sixteen 
teams could only draw approximately fifteen million customers.  During the 
congressional hearings AL President Will Harridge admitted that the league had 
collectively subsidized the fledgling St. Louis Browns.  Faced with these issues, major 
league baseball’s consumer market would be altered, breaking the logjam of big league 
franchises residing in the Northeast and Midwest for half a century. 
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IF YOU BUILD IT THEY WILL COME 
 In the 1950s, major league baseball’s consumer market was impacted by the 
demographic changes in American cities, the impact of technology, and the new 
consumerism.  Historian George Lipsitz states “elite populations and industries 
abandoned older neighborhoods in pursuit of expansion to inexpensive land and low cost 
labor in the south and west.”  Between 1940 and 1970, the west and south increased their 
share of the nation’s income from 33% to 43% and their population rose from 42% in 
1940 to 48% in 1970.  “Sunbelt” cities escaped years of wear and tear, allowing them to 
offer lower taxes and more pleasant surroundings to industries seeking to relocate.  They 
could do so precisely because the desire to escape the effects of urban growth had 
adversely impacted upon the older industrial cities in the first place. 
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 Simultaneously, government spending in the postwar era stimulated economic 
growth and prosperity.  Federal home loans policies, defense spending, highway 
construction, and urban renewal contributed immensely in allowing the federal 
government to channel tax dollars into the private sector.  To urban America, 
government’s role in capital accumulation manifested itself in federal aid, and also in 
local pro-growth coalitions seeking to use public funds as a catalyst for economic 
expansion. 
 The culmination of the demographic trends, government policy, and business 
interest fused itself into what can best be described as the suburban-industrial complex.  
At the peak of the great European immigration in the early twentieth century, 1.2 million 
new immigrants came to America in a single year.  During the 1950s, the same number 
moved to the suburbs every year.  For example, Irving, Texas had a population of 2,621 
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in 1950; ten years later 45,000 people lived there.  That same decade the total population 
increase was only 28 million. 
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 Eastern cities, like Brooklyn and Boston, suffered from the forces that helped 
shaped western and southern cities like Los Angeles and Houston.  Defense spending 
shifted tax dollars from the East Coast to the West Coast.  FHA loans providing mortgage 
insurance for single-family homeowners’ subsidized new and growing suburban cities, 
but this growth had negative consequences for older multi-family dominated cities like 
Brooklyn and Boston.  Moreover, the federal highway program provided industry the 
means to move away from the older industrial centers like New York.  This exodus of the 
population to the suburbs left behind deteriorated formerly middle class neighborhoods.
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 The process of suburbanization coincided with an encore performance of the 
automobile revolution.  From 1945 to 1960, the number of cars in America increased by 
133 percent.  Under the Highway Act of 1956 Congress appropriated $32 billion to build 
41,000 miles of highway.  With the government providing loans for new suburban 
homes, building highways that went to those homes, and with an economy structured 
primarily around the consumption of new housing and automobiles, a spiral of sustained 
prosperity and growth occurred. 
 Consumerism represented one of the essential elements of this prosperity.  
Recreation was a primary focus of this “new consumerism.”  The average family in the 
suburbs earned roughly $6,500, seventy percent higher than the average income for the 
rest of the nation.  More than eight million people traveled abroad in the 1950s.  With all 
the new automobiles and highways, people who stayed at home helped to create a new 
industry of domestic tourism, visiting national parks, and providing consumer amusement 
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areas like Disneyland.  Organized Baseball was in the midst of competing with other 
forms of amusement, spurred by entrepreneurs who saw an opportunity. 
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 By the end of the 1952 season, these changes in demography, in the economy, and 
technology were influential in altering major league baseball’s consumer market.  In 
response to these changes, the owners amended their regulations.  Previously, a franchise 
shift required a unanimous vote from the owners of both leagues under Rule 1(c) of the 
National Agreement.  At the leagues’ 1952 winter meeting, the owners ruled that a team 
could move with a unanimous consent of its own league.  The other league could not 
block the move, if the invaded area was the property of a club in the same league.  
Indemnity payments would be made to both the minor league and the pre-empted club.  
Amendment to Rule 1(c) facilitated major league baseball’s expansion process. 39 
 It was within this context that Milwaukee, Wisconsin became one of several cities 
ripe for either prospective league expansion or franchise relocation.  Referred to as the 
“German Athens,” Milwaukee was in the midst of a dramatic transformation that saw the 
old city of ethnic neighborhoods and aging factories give way to a modern metropolis 
built on the service industries.  Milwaukee was the 13
th
 largest city in America, as its 
population increased from 587,472 in 1940 to 637,392 a decade later.  Between 1940 and 
1970, the number of housing units in the Milwaukee metropolitan area almost doubled, 
increasing from 238,514 to 449,044.  At the peak of the wave in the 1950s, new homes 
were popping up at the rate of nearly 1,000 a month.  Milwaukee County was emblematic 
of the encore performance of the automobile revolution.  The number of motor vehicles 
registered in the county rose from 177,969 to 319,071 in 1955, a 79 percent increase in 
ten years. 
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 To understand how Milwaukee became a coveted city for possible big league 
expansion, it is necessary to analyze the forces that led to the construction of Milwaukee 
County Stadium.  As a member of the American Association, the Milwaukee Brewers 
played in Borchert Field, and according to Neil Sullivan, this “ancient marvel” added to 
the special quality of baseball in the midwest.  Borchert Field was characterized as an 
“undersized firetrap shoehorned into a single city block at Eighth and Chambers.”  Few 
seats afforded a decent vantage of the field, and truculent storms occasionally blew parts 
of the structure onto neighboring homes.  Talk of replacing the ball park began as early as 
1909, when Charles Whitnall, a banker and member of both the city’s Public Land 
Commission and the County’s Park Commission, suggested the construction of a sports 
stadium next to the Menomonee River parkway.  Efforts to build the new ballpark were 
thwarted by America’s entry into World War I and the idea died on the planning table. 41 
 The first concerted efforts to build a municipal stadium began in the 1930s.  Two 
proposals, one in the local city government – the common council – and the other in the 
County Board of Supervisors, marked the start of Milwaukee’s political involvement in 
stadium building.  On September 1, 1931, Alderman Charles C. Schad introduced a 
resolution in the common council, asking for the construction of a 50,000-seat facility.  
Since construction costs were low during the Depression era, Schad estimated that the 
stadium would cost $300,000.  Concurrently, Milwaukee County Supervisor Raymond 
Moore introduced a resolution in the county board asking for a legal opinion on whether 
the county could build a stadium.  The corporation counsel replied in the affirmative, if 
the project was designated as a war memorial.  Thus the municipal stadium would serve 
as a memorial for soldiers who died in World War I.  On October 27, 1936, the county 
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board adopted the Moore resolution and took the initial steps to seek a federal Public 
Works Administration (PWA) grant.  However, it took the county two years to submit 
their application and by that time all PWA projects had been closed down.  Temporarily, 
the board abandoned the idea to build the stadium. 
42
 
 A fundamental obstacle that stalled efforts to build the new stadium was the 
selection of a suitable location.  Neither the county supervisors nor the common council 
could agree on a prospective site.  On March 8, 1938, the county board authorized a study 
of possible locations for a county memorial stadium.  County Supervisor Frederick 
Heath, founder of the newspaper the Social Democratic Herald, recommended the Story 
quarry as the location for the new stadium.  Named after one of the original families that 
settled in Milwaukee, Hiram and Harry Story began quarry operations in 1850, after a 
windstorm revealed some of the hardest limestone in Wisconsin.  The quarry operations 
ceased operations in the mid-1930s when the land was annexed to the city.  
Simultaneously, the Milwaukee common council established a special site committee, 
which recommended that the council acquire 15 acres of tax delinquent land at North 
Holton Street and West Capitol Drive.  The committee proposed the construction of a 
26,000-seat facility at an estimated cost of $650,000.  However, in 1940, the city land 
commission thwarted this proposal by indicating the location was too far from the 
population center.  The commission also recommended the Story quarry. 
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 America’s entry into World War II delayed attempts to build the stadium.  By the 
end of the war, Supervisor Bert Busby introduced a resolution in the county board that, 
according to the Milwaukee Journal, “started the final push.”  The resolution called for 
building a stadium as a war memorial – this time honoring World War II veterans – and 
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recommended that the county park commission study the cost.  More important, for the 
first time the city and the county joined forces.  Meeting separately on February 19, 1946, 
both the common council and the county board appointed a committee to work jointly on 
the project.  In September, the two committees developed a joint report, recommending 
that the stadium be built by the county on the Story quarry and that the city improve the 
surrounding streets. 
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 On February 24, 1947, the county board voted to build a stadium.  Despite the 
joint report’s recommending the stadium be built on the Story quarry site, the board took 
no action on selecting a suitable location.  Rather, they referred two resolutions calling 
for specific locations to the highway committee.  One resolution recommended the Story 
quarry, while the other favored the Haymarket square, located at North 5
th
 and West Vliet 
Street.  Yet another proposal called for the location of the stadium north of the state fair 
park. 
45
 
 Haggling over a suitable location delayed attempts to begin construction.  On 
January 11, 1949, the county board voted to approve the Story location, if a city 
sponsored referendum on a $3.5 million bond issue to improve streets passed.  The 
referendum failed.  The county board reconsidered other locations.  They came within 
one vote of approving the Haymarket square, located on North 5
th
 and West Vliet.  The 
board voted to build the stadium at the state fair park site, but later rescinded its actions 
because the state would not give the county the land without certain reservations 
unacceptable to the board. 
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 Despite the constant bickering over selecting a suitable location, the county board 
continued to flesh out the details to build the stadium.  This action seemed to be 
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premature on the board’s part, since it had yet to choose a suitable location.  However, 
their actions appeared to be consistent with the 1946 joint report that recommended the 
Story site.  In any event, the park commission was assigned this daunting task, and one of 
its first moves was to begin negotiations for additional land with the local and federal 
governments.  The city owned 34 acres of the Story site, including the quarry itself.  The 
federal government owned land south of the Story site, which the county wanted to lease 
for extra parking space.  The commission established a special stadium committee to 
handle the details.  The committee, headed by William R. McGovern, a former president 
of the Wisconsin Telephone Company, was, according to the Milwaukee Journal, to 
become an important force in pushing forward the efforts to build the stadium. 
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 Simultaneously, the Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC) was pivotal in moving 
forward the stadium project.  McGovern was a member of the GMC and this coalition 
exemplified a booster group that were eternal optimists, growth oriented, and willing to 
take risks.  The GMC grew from a group of fifteen Rotarians in 1939 to represent the 
leadership of 200 of the city’s largest corporations.  Although its roster was limited to 
150 members, the GMC owned or managed at least a quarter of the business property in 
the city, with a concentration on the larger end of the scale.  The GMC’s involvement in 
the stadium project represented an overall larger effort to rebuild Milwaukee’s cultural 
infrastructure.  In addition to the stadium, the GMC urged commitments for the 
construction of a new civic center, library addition, zoo, indoor sports arena, museum, art 
center, and an express road from the airport to downtown. 
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 On July 20, 1949, McGovern got Senator Alexander Wiley to introduce a bill in 
Congress.  With the GMC’s support, the bill passed and was signed by President Harry 
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Truman.  Under the terms of the legislation, the county would buy 93 acres at half the 
appraised value, and lease another 22 acres for one dollar a year.  The 93 acres, which the 
city needed for expressway purposes, cost the county $35,000. 
 Although the preliminary plans for construction were completed by June 1950, 
the county board confronted several obstacles that delayed efforts to build the facility.  
The board voted to approve the plans and asked the finance committee to recommend a 
financing plan.  On July 25, the board approved the issuance of $3.5 million worth of 
bonds.  One month later, the board sold two million dollars worth of bonds to a syndicate 
headed by the First National Bank of Chicago at a net interest cost, after premium, of 
1.172%.  However, efforts to begin construction coincided with America’s entry in the 
Korean conflict, resulting in a steel shortage.  Despite this unexpected delay, on October 
19 ground was broken to lay the stadium’s foundation. 49 
 The county board faced another setback that could have killed the stadium 
project.  On October 26, 1950, the National Production Authority (NPA) in Washington, 
D. C. banned construction on any new recreational facilities.  It appeared the stadium 
project would be stalled for the duration of the Korean conflict.  However, projects that 
began prior to the ban could possibly receive an exemption.  With this in mind, 
McGovern went to Washington and put the county’s case before NPA head William H. 
Harrison.  On November 3, Harrison granted the county permission to build the stadium.  
He indicated that an exception was being made because to halt the project would mean an 
“unusual handicap” here.  But Harrison pointed out that the agency could not provide a 
priority on materials for the stadium. 
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 By the spring of 1952, two-thirds of the stadium had been completed when the 
project confronted another delay.  In April, five trade unions went on strike, bringing the 
project to a virtual halt.  Once the strike was settled, stadium construction went smoothly, 
and by the spring of 1953, Milwaukee County Stadium was ready for occupancy.  
According to the Milwaukee Journal, the city and the county had invested a reported 
$4,843,000 in the facility. 
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 Upon the completion of Milwaukee County Stadium, politicians and civic leaders 
had aspirations of luring a major league franchise.  County officials had envisioned a 
structure that would be adaptable to the needs of minor league baseball and professional 
football yet could be converted to major league standards if the need arose.  They 
ambitiously estimated that big league baseball would amass between $5 to 10 million 
annually for the city of Milwaukee.  Roughly half of this attendance was expected to 
come from outside the city.  Civic leaders envisioned thousands of visitors drawn by 
baseball would boost the sales of stores, and the patronage of hotels, restaurants, and 
other businesses.  The desire to bring major league baseball to Milwaukee was not 
without foundation.  Throughout the course of construction, Commissioner Albert 
Chandler proposed an expansion plan that would increase the number of league clubs in 
both circuits from eight to ten clubs.  Cities under consideration for prospective 
expansion included Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and Montreal.  
Conversely, the GMC made overtures to lure the most coveted franchise ripe for 
relocation – the St. Louis Browns.  The Milwaukee Journal reported that GMC President 
Clifford A. Randall, an attorney, began negotiations with Browns’ owner Bill Veeck to 
bring his fledgling AL franchise to their growing city. 
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 The GMC’s proposal to Veeck coincided with his efforts to relocate the Browns.  
Upon acquiring the Browns in the middle of the 1951 season, Veeck had one lofty 
objective – run the Cardinals out of St. Louis.  This goal seemed plausible, since Veeck 
enjoyed two advantages.  Cardinals owner Fred Saigh was under indictment for tax fraud, 
and more importantly, the Redbirds had dropped out of contention after a 1946 World 
Series appearance.  Concurrently, during the 1952 season Veeck quietly contacted 
individual American League owners to obtain their support for a move in the event his 
battle with the Cardinals went badly.  At the winter meetings of that same year, Veeck 
informed his fellow AL owners that the Browns might have to leave St. Louis before the 
start of next season and that he would present them with his plans at the spring meeting in 
Tampa.  By February 1953, the Browns’ future was compromised in the Mound City 
when the Busch Brewery Company purchased the Cardinals.  Veeck recognized he could 
not compete with the wealthy Busch and decided to move his Browns. 
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 Veeck’s desire was to return to Milwaukee, the scene of one of his greatest 
franchise building success.  He owned the Milwaukee Brewers franchise in the early 
1940s, where his flair for promotional schemes came to fruition.  The completion of 
Milwaukee County Stadium and the GMC’s overtures made Veeck’s return there more 
appealing.  But the Browns owner had one problem – Boston Braves owner Lou Perini 
owned the Milwaukee Brewers franchise. 
 Louis R. Perini was born in Ashland, Massachusetts on November 29, 1903.  
When Perini was nine, he already held lofty ambitions of owning a baseball club.  He 
organized a team of boys, named them the Ashland Dreadnaughts, and went about raising 
funds from local merchants to provide the club with uniforms.  His father, Bonfiglio 
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Perini, owned a construction company and when he died in 1924, Louis became president 
of B. Perini & Sons, Inc.  Along with his brothers, Joseph and Charles, Louis had the 
small construction firm expanding rapidly.  By 1936, B. Perini & Sons, Inc. was large 
enough to handle the maintenance on the Cape Cod Canal. 
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 Perini formed a partnership with C. Joseph Maney and Guido L. Rugo.  Maney 
began his career as a timekeeper on Boston’s Washington Street subway tunnel.  By 
1931, he formed the C. J. Maney Company and by 1945 the firm was doing $30 million 
worth of post war construction contracts.  Rugo began as a worker for the Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corporation and later he became the treasurer of the Rugo Construction 
Company.  Better known as the “Three Little Steam Shovels,” the three men first met as 
competitive bidders on numerous construction projects and later joined forces on larger 
jobs such as deep pressure tunnels, ordinance depots, and highway and airport 
construction.  Among their projects were the Tuscarora Mountain tunnel in Pennsylvania, 
and the Park River Conduit in Hartford, Connecticut.  In the decade before he took over 
the Braves, Perini’s company did more than $100,000,000 worth of business. 55 
 In 1941, Perini got involved in baseball at a time when the Boston Braves 
exemplified the National League’s version of the St. Louis Browns – an exercise in 
futility and mediocrity.  Unlike their AL predecessor, the Braves won two NL pennants 
and one world championship in fifty years.  In 1914, the infamous “Miracle Braves” 
defeated Connie Mack’s Philadelphia Athletics in four games.  In other years, the Braves 
finished second once, third twice, fourth seven times, fifth five times, sixth nine times, 
seventh fifteen times, and eighth nine times.  Braves owner Charles F. Adams, a grocery-
chain magnate, had to sell the club because of his connection with the Suffolk Downs 
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racetrack.  Fifteen Bostonians purchased stock, including Perini, Rugo, and Maney.  The 
Braves stumbled along under mass ownership for three years, when Perini, along with 
Rugo and Maney, offered to buy out the other stockholders for what they paid or sell 
their stock on the same terms.  The others sold and the steam shovels quickly replenished 
the club’s treasury.  In 1947, they bought the Milwaukee Brewers for a reported 
$270,000. 
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 Although he did not devise Veeck like promotional schemes, Perini did operate 
the Braves with panache and imagination.  The steam shovels introduced a new Braves 
theme song, four marching bands, a chorus of 7,500 boys from settlement houses and 
boys’ clubs, and an Indian chief from the Wampanog tribe on Cape Cod, Chief Wild 
Horse.  For night games, Perini outfitted the Braves in satin uniforms, installed neon foul 
poles, and set off fireworks.  The Braves gave away automobiles and free trips to spring 
training, placed suggestion boxes around the ball park, and became the first major league 
team to offer fried clams at their concession stands. 
 The steam shovels were fortunate enough to inherit executive John Quinn, a 
Boston college graduate whose father Bob had run the club since 1936.  Quinn and the 
new owners were committed to making the Braves a NL pennant contender.  They 
expanded the farm system, lured manager Billy Southworth from the Cardinals with a 
large contract offer, and purchased several veteran players, many of them from the 
Redbirds.  While many of these players did not help the Braves, others like Bob Elliott, 
Earl Torgeson, and Alvin Dark paid dividends.  After a $3.5 million investment, a 
National League pennant, and four consecutive profitable seasons, the Boston Braves 
were out of debt with a reported surplus of $4,537 in 1949. 
57
 
 37 
 By 1950, however, the Braves fortune began to sour.  The club faltered on the 
field, major league attendance began to decline, and the Braves were unable to compete 
with their AL rivals the Red Sox.  The Braves attendance experienced a sharp decline 
from a high of 1,455,439 in 1948 to 281,000 in 1952.  Perini and his partners seemed 
powerless to prevent the slide. 
 To be sure, the Braves’ anemic attendance influenced Perini’s decision to relocate 
his Braves to Milwaukee.  Despite the club landing in the black in 1949, the profits 
amassed did not justify the huge investment the steam shovels had made.  Yet there was 
still a possibility that Perini could have stayed in Boston.  According to the Sporting 
News, he gave Boston at least one more year to turn things around.  If the situation 
remained bleak in the Hub, Perini would move his Braves before the start of the 1954 
season.  Several factors, however, occurred that changed his original plans. 
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 First, Perini bought out his long time partners, C. Joseph Maney and Guido Rugo, 
making him, along with his brothers Joseph and Charles, the Braves’ sole proprietors.  
During the winter of 1952, Perini told his stockholders that to ensure a better operation 
one person or one family should own the club.  The Perinis offered to buy the stock of the 
other shareholders, paying them the same amount they originally paid.  In this way 
individual shareholders would not have to shoulder the losses the ball club accrued.  
More important, if Perini decided to move his Braves from Boston, he would not have to 
worry about offending any of his partners.  According to sportswriter Al Hirshberg, 
Perini stated that Maney would have never stood for the Braves’ transfer under any 
circumstances. 
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 Bill Veeck’s desire to relocate to Milwaukee and the GMC’s endeavor to lure a 
major league franchise constituted the second factor.  By late 1952, Veeck offered to sell 
Sportsman Park to Frederick C. Miller, CEO of the Miller Brewing Company and a GMC 
member, for a reported $800,000.  This revenue would be used to relocate the Triple A 
Brewers to another city and allow the Browns to relocate to Milwaukee.  At the same 
time, both the GMC and Milwaukee’s local politicians became more aggressive in their 
attempts to lure big league ball there.  GMC President Clifford Randall offered Perini 
$500,000 to move the Brewers to Toledo, Ohio to enable the Browns to move to 
Milwaukee. 
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 External pressure came also from Milwaukee Journal sportswriter R. G. Lynch 
and Mayor Frank Zeidler.  In an exchange of telegrams between Lynch and Perini, the 
Braves owner indicated that he would not stand in the way of Milwaukee receiving a 
major league team.  However, Perini insisted that the Braves’ only condition for leaving 
would be relocating the Brewers to a city “with as good potential as Milwaukee.”  Toledo 
guaranteed a minimum attendance of 200,000 a year for three years, but since that city 
had lost its franchise to Charleston, West Virginia in 1951, Perini evidently took the 
position that the Ohio city didn’t measure up.  Given the overall decline in major and 
minor league attendance, his reservations were understandable. 
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 Simultaneously, Mayor Zeidler contacted Braves’ Vice-President Joseph Cairnes 
and stated that the club did not “want to be in a position of preventing a major league 
franchise from coming to Milwaukee...” The people of Milwaukee had demonstrated 
“their willingness to support a major team erecting a substantial stadium and playing 
field.”  Zeidler added: “The Braves organization would not want their Milwaukee club to 
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be playing to a hostile citizenry...” The mayor was confident that Braves officials would 
“review the whole position very earnestly in order to satisfy the Milwaukee public and 
the needs of baseball generally.”  Concurrently, several organizations suggested that the 
county cancel its contract with Boston that allowed the Brewers to use the stadium.  The 
contract provided for a 30-day notice of cancellation, but it also could be terminated only 
if a major league club moved into the city. 
62
 
 Public pressure and publicity generated pressure not only on Perini, but also on 
major league baseball.  Mayor Zeidler and Governor Walter Kohler, Jr. wrote letters to 
Perini and to Commissioner Ford Frick, calling attention to the interests of the people.  
Wisconsin Congressman Clem Zablocki looked into the possibilities of antitrust action.  
Clifford Randall and stadium director Frederick Mendelson garnered enthusiastic support 
from business leaders and fans to bring major league baseball to the German Athens. 
 The possibility of antitrust action represented the third factor.  The fact that 
Congressman Zablocki considered this possibility was a cause for concern for major 
league baseball.  As Boston Globe sportswriter Harold Kaese accurately pointed out: “It 
did not take an act of Congress to break up the old league batting order, only an 
investigation by a Congressional committee.”  Major league owners did not want to risk 
the chance of Congress lifting its antitrust exemption.  More important, Perini recognized 
the need for major league baseball to expand into these growing metropolises.  He was 
quoted as saying that the major leagues could not continue to ignore cities like Los 
Angeles, Seattle, Houston, and Montreal, but expansion should occur within the 
framework of baseball law and not by an act of Congress. 
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 Finally, Lou Perini represented a new generation that took over the ownership of 
major league teams.  Marshall states that the gentlemen sportsmen were followed during 
the 1940s by a new generation of owners – the capitalists.  These men who either earned 
or inherited their money viewed the sport as a financial opportunity and operated their 
clubs solely on business grounds.  In addition to the steam shovels buying the Braves and 
Busch acquiring the Cardinals, Del Webb, Larry MacPhail, and Dan Topping bought the 
Yankees from Jacob Ruppert’s estate.  MacPhail was a baseball man, but Topping and 
Webb came from completely different backgrounds.  In 1947, the heirs of Barney 
Dreyfuss sold the Pittsburgh Pirates to a contingent that included Indianapolis banker 
Frank McKinney, lawyer/businessman Thomas P. Johnson, real estate mogul John 
Galbreath, and Hollywood entertainer Bing Crosby.  Finally, Bob Carpenter, a scion of 
the wealthy Du Pont family, purchased the Philadelphia Phillies. 
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 Combined, these factors led Lou Perini to move the Braves to Milwaukee.  
Pressure generated from politicians, the GMC, and Bill Veeck placed the Braves owner 
in the role of a villain, if he prevented major league ball from coming to the beer capital.  
The negative publicity alone was not in Perini’s best interests.  More important, since 
Perini saw the Braves as a financial opportunity, it made no business sense to continue 
investing substantial sums of money into a losing proposition.  It should be noted, 
however, that moving to Milwaukee did not guarantee the Braves’ financial predicament 
would improve.  In fact the Braves were moving from a larger market to a smaller one.  
However, the conditions in Boston made it untenable to remain there.  As sportswriter Al 
Hirshberg pointed out, Braves Field had long outlived its usefulness, “because there was 
nothing very good about it.”  The ballpark was located on a single streetcar line, off a 
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single main thoroughfare.  It had inadequate parking and the main entrance was on a 
dead-end street, opposite a busy armory whose trucks used the same street.  Braves Field 
was one of the hardest public places in Boston to reach.  More troubling to Perini, 
advanced ticket sales were 35 percent behind the previous season.  Faced with these 
issues, Milwaukee would have major league baseball for the start of the 1953 season, but 
it would be Perini’s Braves and not Veeck’s Browns who would move there. 65 
 When Perini refused to sell his Triple A Brewers, or relocate them to another city, 
Veeck turned his attention to Baltimore.  Perini quietly established a coalition among the 
NL owners to move his franchise.  On March 18, 1953, the NL owners unanimously 
approved Perini’s request to move his Braves to Milwaukee.  Brooklyn Dodgers owner 
Walter O’Malley made the motion that Perini be allowed to make the shift.  New York 
Giants magnate Horace Stoneham seconded the motion.  On the same day, the American 
Association approved the Brewers’ transfer to Toledo and Perini made a $50,000 
indemnity payment to the circuit.  Because the Braves relocated into the western half of 
the National League, the owners revised the playing schedule.  The Pittsburgh Pirates 
moved into the eastern division and took over the Braves schedule.  The Braves took over 
the Pirates schedule. 
 Simultaneously, the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors voted unanimously 
to permit the Braves to play in the new stadium.  Under the terms of the lease, the county 
would rent the stadium to the Braves for a nominal sum of $1,000 a year for the first two 
years.  For the next three years the county would receive five percent of the revenues 
from the gate receipts and most of the concession sales.  The county would provide 
additional lighting to conform to major league standards, erect additional permanent seats 
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“sufficient to meet the reasonable requirements of the National League,” and provide 
additional office space and concession stands.  What constituted “National League 
standards” was not made explicit.  The Braves received all revenue from broadcasting 
and telecasting of games for the first five years, subject to renegotiation once the contract 
expired.  The Braves agreed to maintain the field, while the county reimbursed the club 
for maintenance costs incurred due to events other than baseball.  The county would have 
all advertising rights at the stadium, except for those involved in radio and television 
broadcasts.  The Braves would operate concessions for all events, including football, but 
the county was expected to receive a share of the revenues for events other than 
baseball.
66
 
 Clearly Perini received a generous leasing agreement.  The price for obtaining big 
league status was substantially high considering the huge investment the city of 
Milwaukee had made.  County officials expected to generate revenue for the city by 
staging auxiliary events like boxing matches, semiprofessional and black baseball games 
and basketball contests.  With the Braves as their tenant, the county expected to expand 
their market potential to attract fans from cities like Racine, Kenosha, Sheboygan, 
Oshkosh, and Green Bay Wisconsin.  Undoubtedly they envisioned these fans spending 
consumer dollars in Milwaukee.  It is problematic to suggest that this was the case.  
County officials and city fathers probably overestimated the potential “new” dollars the 
city could generate with a major league franchise.  What is certain is that the Braves 
would benefit significantly by drawing fans from within this 115-mile radius of the city.  
Moreover, the Braves’ leasing agreement marked the start of post-World War II cities 
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offering attractive incentives to encourage major league franchises to relocate to their 
growing metropolises. 
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Nevertheless, to this generation of politicians and local boosters this large 
investment was worth it to them to revitalize Milwaukee’s cultural infrastructure.  The 
Braves relocation to Milwaukee coincided with the city riding a wave of unprecedented 
prosperity, rising to new heights as an industrial power, and surging to an all-time 
population peak.  Milwaukee welcomed new institutions that included an urban 
university, basketball and hockey teams, and an ultra-modern Memorial Center.  
Relegated for decades to a position in the second tier of American cities, Milwaukee 
aspired to higher things. 
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 The Braves illustrated the importance civic leaders and local politicians placed on 
obtaining major league status to redefine its national identity in the 1950s.  Mayor Zeidler 
typified the rhetoric of local politicians when he stated that Milwaukee had “long felt we 
were a capable people but because of our peculiar geography...our voice has not been 
heard in the land.”  The mayor added: “This [the Braves] is a means of letting people 
know we exist.”  “Have you heard,” the Greater Milwaukee Committee asked in its 1954 
report.  “We live not in Milwaukee (Wis.), WE LIVE IN MILWAUKEE!”  Clifford 
Randall stated the Braves move to Milwaukee was “an historical example of the fact that 
the community can be as great as its citizens want it to be.”  The rhetoric of these post-
World War II boosters and politicians served as a form of ideological legitimacy to 
concentrate economic and political power to bring major league baseball to their growing 
metropolis. 
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 On April 14, 1953, the Milwaukee Braves played the St. Louis Cardinals in their 
home opener.  Centerfielder Bill Bruton hit a solo home run in the bottom of the tenth 
inning to give the Braves a 3-2 victory before a reported crowd of 34,157 fans.  
Milwaukee’s love affair with their Braves had begun. 
CONCLUSION 
 Major League Baseball’s expansion process was influenced significantly by the 
Pacific Coast League’s desire to become a third major league.  Their efforts were in 
response to Donald Barnes’ attempt to relocate his St. Louis Browns – along with civic 
boosters enticing them – to Los Angeles.  PCL officials responded to this encroachment 
into their territory by seeking to elevate their entire league to major league classification, 
within the parameters of baseball law.  Major league owners reacted by establishing a 
policy allowing individual magnates to relocate their clubs into a new market, if they 
were willing to bear the expense and make the necessary negotiations.  Throughout the 
PCL’s plight, the stadium remained the sole constant that determined whether a league or 
city was a “potential major league territory.”  Given the size of their ballparks in the late 
1940s, major league owners never seriously considered elevating the PCL to a big league 
classification. 
 The Pacific Coast League’s attempt to become a third major league occurred 
simultaneously with the changing demographics of American cities, changes in 
technology and in the political economy, and the emergence of the new consumerism.  In 
some ways, the PCL residing in the fastest growing region of the country frustrated their 
efforts.  The league’s largest city – Los Angeles – grew disproportionately larger than the 
other league cities.  Civic boosters like Supervisor Leonard Roach and sportswriter 
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Vincent Flaherty, sought to distanced themselves from the other PCL cities and draw an 
existing MLB franchise or become an expansion team.  Their endeavors were constantly 
thwarted by MLB’s territorial principle.  The National League appeared to be more 
receptive to expansion.  However, because baseball law required a unanimous consent 
from the owners of both leagues to either relocate a franchise or add new teams.  These 
delaying tactics led to extensive congressional hearings to pressure the owners to expand.  
Combined with a decline in overall attendance and the threat of lifting MLB’s antitrust 
exemption, the owners amended their bylaws to facilitate the expansion process.  They 
maintained their policy that allowed an individual owner to move their franchise, if they 
took on that responsibility, however. 
 The Boston Braves’ relocation to Milwaukee coincided with civic leaders and 
local politicians’ endeavors to revitalize the city’s cultural infrastructure.  The 
construction of Milwaukee County Stadium and luring the Braves from the Hub served to 
shatter the city’s second tier image and redefine its national identity.  Yet it still required 
a significant degree of external pressure to coerce Lou Perini to move his club.  Unlike 
the civic leaders in Los Angeles, Milwaukee’s politicians and boosters formed a strong 
coalition to bring big league ball to the German Athens.  Ironically, the city benefited 
from the constant bickering over finding a suitable location to build the facility.  By the 
time Milwaukee County Stadium was completed, major league baseball was primed to 
move its struggling franchises. 
 Yet it appears that the city of Milwaukee paid a high price for obtaining major 
league status and redefining its national identity.  The County Supervisors and the GMC 
probably overestimated the prospective windfall they expected to receive by housing the 
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Braves.  Their efforts did exemplify the willingness of post-World War II cities to build 
lavish stadiums, offering incentives to hard to resist, luring an existing franchise or 
encouraging MLB to expand.  For major league baseball, however, franchise relocation 
marked the start of a dramatic restructuring of the industry’s consumer market into its 
current configuration. 
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